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INTRODUCTION 
On May 14, 2012, a combat helicopter operated by European Union 
Naval Forces (EUNAVFOR) struck a pirate base ashore in Somalia.1  The 
raid destroyed several fiberglass skiffs on the beach in Haradheere, a town 
on the coast of central Somalia.2  The attack represented a new tactic used 
in the protracted and evolving international effort to fight maritime piracy 
off the coast of Somalia.  It was the first time that force ashore, first 
authorized by the United Nations Security Council in 2008, had been 
publicly acknowledged.3 
Though recently receding, piracy off the coast of Somalia has had a 
destabilizing effect on maritime commerce since at least 2008.4  The 
problem has not suffered from lack of attention.  Navies from across the 
globe patrol the seas off of Somalia, many multinational conferences have 
addressed the issue, and dozens of articles have analyzed and suggested 
solutions to the problem.5  Many observers have explained the recent drop 
by pointing to the increased use of private armed security teams on 
commercial vessels that transit pirate-infested waters.6  While that may be 
the case, this Article examines the legal framework for a strategy that has 
not been attempted on any great scale—the use of military force ashore in 
Somalia to disrupt and deter piracy off its coast. 
This analysis is important for at least two reasons.  First, piracy might 
only be receding temporarily.  Little has been done on land in Somalia to 
 
 1.  Jeffrey Gettleman, Toughening its Stand, European Union Sends Forces to Strike Somali 
Pirate Base, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/16/world/africa/european-
forces-strike-pirate-base-in-somalia.html. 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Int’l Mar. Org., Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Annual Report–
2009 2, IMO Doc. MSC.4/Circ. 152 (Mar. 29, 2010) [hereinafter IMO Piracy Report]. 
 5.  See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 1950, ¶¶ 16–50, U.N. Doc. S/2011/662 (Oct. 25, 2010) [hereinafter Res. 1950 Report]. 
 6.  See Security Keeping Gulf of Aden Pirates at Bay, OCEAN PROTECTION SERVICES (June 29, 
2012), http://www.oceanprotectionservices.com/articles/?p=1865 (“. . .[the] Minister of Shipping for 
the Department of Transport in the UK [. . .] said the adoption of more self-defensive measures by 
private shipping companies to fend off pirate attacks is certainly helping to stem the onslaught of 
marauding pirates”). 
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disrupt the pirates’ core infrastructure and capabilities.  Indeed, as recently 
as August 2013, fifty-seven hostages and four vessels were still being held 
for ransom, though hostages continue to be released and the number has 
continued to drop.7  Second, piracy is not a new phenomenon.  A close look 
at the legal framework for the use of force ashore that developed in this 
recent flare-up could yield important lessons for dealing more effectively 
with future problems. 
Throughout this crisis, military and maritime security experts 
identified action ashore as most likely to disrupt piracy off the coast of 
Somalia.8  The U.N. Security Council, which has addressed the issue many 
times, first authorized in 2008 “all necessary measures . . . in Somalia” to 
suppress piracy at sea, and has subsequently renewed its authorization on 
an annual basis.9  Even so, the EUNAVFOR’s May 2012 strike in 
Haradheere was the first publicly acknowledged use of force following the 
U.N.’s 2008 authorization.10  Legal uncertainties surrounding what type of 
 
 7.  According to the International Maritime Bureau, as of August 2013. See Piracy News & 
Figures, ICC COMMERCIAL CRIME SERVICES, http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/piracy 
newsafigures (last visited May 17, 2015); see also  OFFICER OF THE WATCH, MARITIME PIRACY MON. 
REP. 2 (Aug. 2013). In June 2014, eleven sailors held hostage for three and a half years were freed.  
Somali Pirates Release Sailors, AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE, June 7, 2014, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/08/world/africa/somali-pirates-release-sailors-held-for-years.html.  
As recently as October 2014, an additional seven sailors were exchanged for ransom.  Somalia: Pirates 
Release Indian Sailors Held for 4 Years, REUTERS, Oct. 31, 2014, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/01/world/africa/somalia-pirates-free-indian-sailors-held-for-4-
years.html. Additionally, one commentator noted in October 2013 that recent conditions in southern 
Somalia had created the conditions for piracy to resurface. See Currun Singh, Al Shabab Fights the 
Pirates, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/23/opinion/international/al-
shabab-fights-the-pirates.html. 
 8.  See LAUREN PLOCH ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40528, PIRACY OFF THE HORN OF 
AFRICA 27 (2009); see also Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Military: Somali Pirates Expanding Their Range, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2011, http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/01/26/us-military-somali-pirates-
expanding-their-range. Legislative leaders in the U.S. have also encouraged action ashore. See Ike 
Skelton, House Armed Services Committee Chairman Skelton Urges President Obama to Fight Piracy 
by Denying Safe Haven in Somalia, U.S. FED. NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 17, 2009 (“I encourage [President 
Obama] to pursue these pirates beyond the waters we are currently patrolling and into the safe havens 
where they are operating. Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution requires no less. Furthermore, 
established authorities such as United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1846 and 1851 have 
expanded the ability of international forces to conduct counter-piracy operations within Somali 
territory.”). 
 9.  S.C. Res. 1851, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008) (“[s]tates and regional 
organizations for which advance notification has been provided by the TFG to the Secretary-General 
may undertake all necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia, for the purpose of suppressing 
acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, pursuant to the request of the TFG, . . . consistent with 
applicable international humanitarian and human rights law.”). This authority has been renewed 
annually. See S.C. Res. 2125, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2125 (Nov. 18, 2013). 
 10.  Gettleman, supra note 2.  Although there have been other uses of force in Somalia related to 
piracy, they generally fell into the category of hostage rescue versus disrupting pirate activities.  See, 
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force ashore was authorized, and what law applied to such force, possibly 
contributed to the delay.11 
This Article analyzes the international legal framework authorizing 
and governing the use of force on land in Somalia to eliminate the pirates’ 
means of carrying out lethal attacks at sea.  Part I addresses the 
fundamental question of whether the use of military force against pirates 
and their bases ashore is legally supportable.  Several major justifications 
are examined, including consent of the sovereign, decisions of the U.N. 
Security Council, and self-defense.  I argue that because the Security 
Council has authorized “all necessary measures” pursuant to Somali 
government consent, the use of force in Somalia to accomplish the goal of 
suppressing piracy at sea is authorized, consistent with the limitations set 
forth in the applicable Resolutions. 
After concluding that the Security Council’s mandate includes 
military force in Somalia, Part II examines what body of law would apply 
to the practical implementation of such operations.  The case of armed 
pirates’ activities ashore is unique in that it may not rise to the level of a 
traditional armed conflict—the threshold at which International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL), sometimes referred to as the Law of Armed 
Conflict (LOAC), would apply.  IHL is considered the lex specialis 
generally applicable to the use of force.12  The question of how an armed 
conflict with groups of pirate-fighters would be characterized is fully 
explored in this section.  I conclude that even if this unique scenario does 
not rise to the level of an armed conflict, there are significant reasons why 
IHL should be found to apply to the limited use of force in Somalia.  Most 
importantly, the application of IHL is necessary to give full effect to the 
 
e.g., French Troops Seize Somali Pirates After Hostages are Freed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2008, 
http://www. 
nytimes.com/2008/04/11/world/africa/11iht-yacht.4.11921315.html. 
 11.  See Eugene Kontorovich, International Legal Responses to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, 
ASIL INSIGHTS (Feb. 6, 2009), http://www.asil.org/insights090206.cfm; see also ROBIN GEISS & ANNA 
PETRIG, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AT SEA: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTER-PIRACY 
OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA AND THE GULF OF ADEN 131–34 (2011). 
 12.  There is considerable debate about whether—and how—IHL would displace other legal 
norms, most notably international human rights law. For the purpose of this Article, I set aside the 
challenging question of overlap and focus on the potential application of IHL. Even so, some 
difficulties presented by potential areas of overlap are explored in Part II, infra. See also Oona 
Hathaway, Which Law Governs During Armed Conflict? The Relationship Between International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1883, 1893–912 (2012); U.N. OFF. OF 
THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTIONS OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN ARMED CONFLICT, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/01, U.N. Sales No. E.11.XIV.3 (2011); Francoise 
J. Hampson, The Relationship Between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law from 
the Perspective of a Human Rights Treaty Body, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 549, 550 (2008). 
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Security Council’s decision, at Somalia’s request, that force be used in 
Somalia to suppress piracy. 
It is true that pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia continue to 
recede.13  At the same time, reports indicate that suspected pirates and even 
innocent fisherman are being killed by overeager and untrained security 
guards embarked on vessels transiting pirate-infested waters.14  If the recent 
ebb of maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia is due to private embarked 
security teams using unlawful force against pirates, it may be time to 
rethink any assumption that the use of targeted force ashore is too risky, or 
less humane.15 
The use of force ashore naturally carries with it great risks as well.  
While I briefly note the most significant ones, I set aside as much as 
possible any broader considerations of policy and strategy.  My goal is to 
propose a framework for how operations can be planned and conducted to 
satisfy international legal regimes if the use of force ashore meets desired 
policy ends. 
I. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE USE OF FORCE IN SOMALIA 
Depending on the circumstances, at least three possible justifications 
could support the use of force in Somali land territory to suppress piracy.  
Before looking at each of these possible justifications in more detail, 
though, it is worth a brief look at what organized groups of armed pirates in 
Somalia actually do on dry land. 
With the ability to launch attacks up to 1,000 miles off of the Somali 
coast, the shore-based infrastructure to support sustained piracy operations 
is robust.16  At one point, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
 
 13.  See Singh, supra note 7. 
 14.  See Michelle Wiese Bockmann & Alan Katz, Shooting to Kill Pirates Risks Blackwater 
Moment, BLOOMBERG, May 9, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-08/shooting-to-kill-
pirates-risks-blackwater-moment.html (“According to many interviewed maritime security firms, ship 
owner groups, lawyers and insurance companies, fear of pirate attacks has increased the likelihood of 
violent encounters at sea, as untrained or overeager vessel guards have resorted to shooting 
indiscriminately without first properly assessing the actual threat level. In the process, they have killed 
both pirates and sometimes innocent fishermen as well as jeopardized the reputation of private maritime 
security firms with their reckless gun use. Since many of the new maritime security companies that 
have emerged often also enlist the services of off-duty policemen and former soldiers that saw combat 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, worries of a ‘Blackwater out in the Indian Ocean’ have only intensified.”). 
 15.  The use of force on board vessels is governed by the flag state’s domestic law.  See U.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 94, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 
[hereinafter UNCLOS]. This would include criminal liability for the unlawful use of force by armed 
security personnel, but further analysis of this liability is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 16.  David Von Drehle, The Arabia Sea, TIME, Feb. 28, 2011, at 13 (noting that the Somali pirates 
“have extended their range as far south as Madagascar and as far east as the islands off India.”). 
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knew of at least nine substantial logistics centers.17  The largest, termed 
“Great Pumpkin” because orange tarps were visible well out into the sea, at 
one time contained vast numbers of small boats, or skiffs, as wells as 
whalers and other larger vessels capable of serving as “mother ships”—
floating logistics bases that organized pirate groups use to extend their 
reach and to launch attacks farther from shore.18  Pirate clans also store 
consumable supplies ashore in bulk, including barrels of fuel and water, 
grappling hooks, automatic and semi-automatic weapons, and utility 
vehicles.19 
Higher up the pirate organizational chain, financiers and pirate clan 
leaders direct operations from secure centers, sometimes isolated from the 
civilian population.20  “Somali pirates operate from well-equipped and 
well-armed bases ashore along the Indian Ocean coast of Central Somalia 
and Puntland, from the port towns of Caluula, Eyl, Hobyo, and 
Haradheere.”21  Pirate networks are even reportedly funded via a “stock 
exchange” located in Haradheere, at which investors can buy or sell shares 
in upcoming attacks.22  Ransom negotiators work from shore,23 and the 
trafficking in weapons—predominantly AKMs, RPG-7s, AK47s, and semi-
automatic pistols such as the TT-30,24 as well as grenade-launchers—is 
usually completed ashore.  Though it remains controversial, circumstantial 
evidence has tied pirate clans to Al Shabaab, the Islamic militant group 
widely considered a terrorist organization.25 
Pirate operations ashore thus represent a center of gravity that 
supports their continued attacks on vessels at sea by organized groups of 
armed pirate-fighters.  Disrupting this center of gravity by denying them 
 
 17.  See Nato Frustrated Amid Somali Piracy Deluge, BBC NEWS (Oct. 22, 2010), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-11609724. 
 18.  Id.; see also Tom Tulloch, The Problem with Pirates, 71 SITREP 3, 5 (2011). 
 19.  Nato Frustrated Amid Somali Piracy Deluge, supra note 17; Tulloch, supra note 18. 
 20.  See U.S. NAT’L SECURITY COUNCIL, COUNTERING PIRACY OFF THE HORN OF AFRICA: 
PARTNERSHIP & ACTION PLAN (2008) [hereinafter PARTNERSHIP & ACTION PLAN]. 
 21.  Id. at 5. 
 22.  Bruce Sterling, The Pirate Stock Exchange, WIRED, Dec. 3, 2009, http://www.wired.com/ 
beyond_the_beyond/2009/12/the-pirate-stock-exchange. 
 23.  See United States v. Ali, 870 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 24. See Somali Pirates Killed “Legally”, BBC NEWS (Dec. 19, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/uk_news/england/devon/7791236.stm. 
 25.  See, e.g., Jonathan Saul and Camila Reed, Shabaab-Somali pirate links growing: UN adviser, 
REUTERS (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/20/ozatp-somalia-shabaab-pirates-
idAFJOE79J0G620111020; see also Richard Lough, Piracy ransom cash ends up with Somali militants, 
REUTERS (Jul. 6, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/06/somalia-piracy-idUSLDE7650 
U320110706; Al Qaeda Urges Somalis To Attack Ships, CBS (Apr. 16, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com 
/8301-503543_162-4949488-503543.html; but see Singh, supra note 7. 
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logistics and operating bases ashore would likely cripple their ability to 
continue to sustain attacks at sea. 
Although the number of recently reported pirate attacks is down 
significantly, there is little evidence that the Somali pirates’ capacity for 
continued violence has been diminished.26  Indeed, armed pirates are still 
holding hostages ashore and could re-commence attacks if the widespread 
deployment of armed security on board transiting merchant vessels is 
abated.27  The Somali government has continued to request international 
support, most recently in November 2013.28  The government’s consistent 
requests for support from 2008 through the present, even in the face of an 
apparent decline in piracy attacks at sea, underscore their inability to deal 
with the militia-type lawlessness of the armed groups of pirates, including 
the holding of hostage-prisoners ashore.29  Thus, a legal framework for 
possible action ashore is an important part of any effective long-term anti-
piracy strategy. 
There are at least three possible justifications under international law 
that would support the use of force in Somali land territory to suppress 
piracy.  First, the U.N. Security Council could act—and indeed has acted—
to authorize such force.30  Because this authorization is still currently in 
effect and has presumably been relied upon by states to support military 
operations, it is the most relevant to this analysis.31 
This current authorization is further legitimized by a second, ongoing 
justification of consent on the part of the Somali government.32  Though 
 
 26.  See Singh, supra note 7. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  See S.C. Res. 2125, supra note 9, at 2 (“. . .noting the several requests from Somali authorities 
for international assistance to counter piracy off its coast, including the letter of 12 November 2013, 
from the Permanent Representative of Somalia to the United Nations expressing the appreciation of 
Somali authorities to the Security Council for its assistance, expressing their willingness to consider 
working with other States and regional organizations to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea off the 
coast of Somalia, and requesting that the provisions of resolution 2077 (2012) be renewed for an 
additional twelve months.”). 
 29.  Throughout this Article, “Somalia” and “Somali government” refer to the internationally 
recognized sovereign authority of the state of Somalia. Prior to August 20, 2012, this was the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which is referenced in Resolution 1851. See TRANSITIONAL 
FEDERAL CHARTER FOR THE SOMALI REPUBLIC, Feb. 2004.  In 2012, the Federal Republic of Somalia 
was created by a new constitution. See PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 
SOMALIA, Aug. 1, 2012. Both have the same functional authority under international law as the 
recognized sovereign government of Somalia, and are treated the same for purposes of this Article. 
 30.  S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, ¶ 6; S.C. Res. 2125, supra note 9, ¶ 10. 
 31.  S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, ¶ 6; S.C. Res. 2125, supra note 9, ¶ 10; see also Gettleman, 
supra note 1. 
 32.  See S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, ¶ 10 (“[the Council] affirms further that such authorizations 
have been provided only following the receipt of the 9 December 2008 letter conveying the consent of 
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Somalia could also grant consent to third-party states on an ad hoc basis 
under its sovereign authority and consistent with its international legal 
obligations, there are no indications that it has done so.  Instead, the current 
framework seems to be consent-based, but ratified by the Security Council 
under its Chapter VII authority. 
A third potential justification, self-defense, does not seem to have 
been proposed or debated in the situation in Somalia on any significant 
scale.  It could potentially arise, however, in the more limited case of 
hostage rescue operations.  Each of these potential justifications will be 
examined in turn. 
A. U.N. Security Council action under Chapter VII 
The U.N. Security Council has the power to determine “the existence 
of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,” and to 
“decide what measures shall be taken . . . to restore international peace and 
security.”33  If the Council deems the threat significant enough, it may 
authorize “action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain 
or restore international peace and security.”34 
The Security Council has addressed the issue of piracy off the coast of 
Somalia at least twelve times, beginning with Resolution 1816 in 2008.35  
This and other early resolutions are widely considered not to have created 
any significant new international legal authority, and mostly call on states 
to take actions that were already authorized under international law.36  
Resolution 1816 did include authority for states cooperating with the 
Somali government to enter Somali territorial waters “for the purpose of 
repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea,” but it did not include 
any mention of Somali land territory.37  Thus, despite its seemingly broad 
 
the [Somali Transitional Federal Government]”); see also Tullio Treves, Piracy, Law of the Sea, and 
Use of Force: Developments off the Coast of Somalia, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 399, 406 (2009). 
 33.  U.N. Charter art. 39, ¶ 1. 
 34.  U.N. Charter art. 42, ¶ 1. 
 35.  S.C. Res. 1816, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1838, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1838 (Oct. 7, 2008); S.C. Res. 1846, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008); Error! Bookmark 
not defined.S.C. Res. 1897, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1897 (Nov. 30, 2009); S.C. Res. 1918, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1918 (Apr. 27, 2010); S.C. Res. 1950, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1950 (Nov. 23, 2010); S.C. Res. 1976, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1976 (Apr. 11, 2011); S.C. Res. 2015, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2015 (Oct. 24, 2011); S.C. 
Res. 2020, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2020 (Nov. 22, 2011); S.C. Res. 2077, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2077 (Nov. 21, 
2012); S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9; S.C. Res. 2125, supra note 9. 
 36.  See S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 35, 1, (“Further reaffirming that international law, as reflected 
in [UNCLOS], sets out the legal framework applicable to combating piracy and armed robbery at sea”). 
This affirmation can also be found in S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, at 1, S.C. Res 1897, supra note 35, 
at 1, and S.C. Res 1918, supra note 35, at 1. See also GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 11, at 72–3. 
 37.  S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 35, ¶ 7. 
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language, the Council’s first steps did not empower nations to do much 
beyond what they already could, and certainly did not purport to take any 
action with respect to Somali territory.38 The authorizations were 
effectively a call to states to take the full measures within their power to 
fight piracy at sea.39 
1. Resolution 1851: Authorization and Restrictions of Operative 
Paragraph 6 
In December 2008, the Security Council greatly expanded its 
authorization by taking action under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.40  
Resolution 1851 authorized states to take counter-piracy action on Somali 
land territory, and it authorized “all necessary measures” to do so, 
connoting military force.41  The specific authorization, though, came with 
important caveats, set forth in Operative Paragraph 6: 
“States and regional organizations . . . for which advance 
notification has been provided by the TFG [Transitional Federal 
Government of Somalia] to the Secretary-General may undertake 
all necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia, for the 
purpose of suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, 
pursuant to the request of the TFG, . . . consistent with applicable 
international humanitarian and human rights law.42 
While Paragraph 6 clearly broadened enforcement measures to Somali 
land territory, there has been debate as to how far that broadening was 
intended to go, and what specific measures are in fact authorized.43  States 
may undertake “all necessary measures”—text that is commonly accepted 
 
 38.  See GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 11, at 71–72 (explaining that S.C. Res. 1846 is widely 
interpreted to have expanded enforcement measures authorized on the high seas into Somali territorial 
waters). 
 39.  Id. One area in which authority was expanded was the entry into Somali territorial waters.  
States responded to this charge through international naval action. See Res. 1950 Report, supra note 5 , 
¶ 66. 
 40.  S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, at 2. 
 41.  Id., See also GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 11, at 83. 
 42.  S.C. Res. 1851, supra, note 9, ¶ 6 (emphasis added). 
 43.  The debate surrounding the adoption of S.C. Res. 1851 indicated disagreement on how 
exactly the land-based authorization would be worded, but it is generally accepted that the authorization 
includes Somali land territory and the airspace above it.  See Kontorovich, supra note 11 (stating that 
Resolution 1851 “extend[s] the authorization of military force to land-based operations in Somalia 
mainland”) (internal citation omitted). See also Douglas Guilfoyle, The Laws of War and the Fight 
against Somali Piracy: Combatants or Criminals?, 11 MELBOURNE J. OF INT’L L., 1, 7 (2010); GEISS & 
PETRIG, supra note 11, at 82, 131–34; but see Security Council Passes New Resolution on Somalia 
Piracy, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE ( Dec. 17, 2008), available at http://www.aaj.tv/2008/12/security-
council-passes-new-resolution-on-somalia-piracy/ (“to overcome objections from countries such as 
Indonesia, the sponsors dropped an earlier reference in the text to “ashore” or “including in Somali 
airspace.”). 
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to include the authorization for military force—but in this case with several 
express and implied restrictions.44 
First, advance notification must be “provided by the [Somali federal 
government] to the Secretary-General.”45  Besides the express requirement 
that the Somali government notify the Secretary-General prior to the 
commencement of any operation within Somali territory, the provision also 
could be interpreted to include an implied requirement that the Somali 
government must concur with each action taken under the paragraph.46  
Presumably, if the TFG does not concur, it need not notify the Secretary-
General and the proposed measures would therefore not come to bear.  Of 
note, there is nothing in the Resolution requiring the Somali government to 
make any particular notification, but the notification necessarily must be 
made in order for the authority contained in the Resolution to become 
effective.47 
Second, measures taken must be “appropriate in Somalia” and “for the 
purpose of suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea.”48  It is not 
clear whether the mandate that the action be “appropriate” adds any 
substantive restriction, especially given that the Somali government must 
implicitly approve any operation. The requirement that action on land 
likewise be linked to the suppression of piracy at sea is very general and 
consistent with the broadened mandate of Paragraph 6. 
Finally, measures taken must be “consistent with applicable 
international humanitarian and human rights law.”49  The reference to both 
IHL, as well as the more generally applicable human rights law (HRL), is 
significant.  It is an implicit recognition that, given the gravity of the threat 
to international security that piracy poses, there may be limited situations in 
which IHL would apply to the “all necessary measures” authorized 
 
 44.  See ALEX CONTE, SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE UNITED NATIONS, AFGHANISTAN 
AND IRAQ 155–57 (2005); see also GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 11, at 83. Additionally, though not 
currently at issue, the authorization was set to expire after twelve months from the date of adoption of 
resolution 1851. See S.C. Res. 1851 supra note 9, ¶ 6. It has subsequently been extended annually, most 
recently in November 2013 for an additional twelve months, and has not lapsed since originally 
implemented. See also S.C. Res. 2125, supra note 9, at 2 (noting that the Somali government provided 
continued consent in a letter dated November 12, 2013). 
 45.  S.C. Res. 1851 supra note 9, ¶ 6. 
 46.  S.C. Res. 1851 also contains a further restriction limiting it to “cooperating states.” Id. This 
section analyzes the requirement for notification to the Secretary-General by the TFG, which I consider 
to be substantively the same. The precise mechanics of this process are not clear, and how they were 
executed in practice during the EUNAVFOR use of force has not been made publicly available. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. ¶ 6. 
 49.  Id. 
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ashore.50  Because IHL is the lex specialis that generally applies to the use 
of force during times of armed conflict,51 the Security Council’s reference 
to it implies that at least some use of military force was envisioned 
pursuant to the authority granted in Paragraph 6.  The inclusion of IHL 
would otherwise have no practical effect.  The body of law that actually 
applies to measures taken against pirates depends on several factors and is 
analyzed in Part II. 
2. Other indications that Resolution 1851 authorizes military force 
In addition to the “all necessary measures” authorization contained in 
Paragraph 6, several other factors support an interpretation that the Security 
Council intended to authorize the use of military force ashore.52 
First, the U.N. published Resolution 1851 by heralding that the 
Security Council “authorizes states to use land-based operations in 
Somalia.”53  Paragraph 2 of that Resolution permits, without geographic 
restriction, the “seizure and disposition of boats, vessels, arms and other 
related equipment” when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting their 
use in piracy.54 This implies that destruction is also permissible, 
particularly if seizure is impractical.  The use of the term “disposition” 
implies that the seizing state can dispose of the materiel seized lawfully,55 
including destroying it remotely on land.56  The text of Resolution 1851, 
 
 50.  Some have maintained that the reference to IHL “appears to be a savings clause included out 
of an abundance of caution.” See, e.g., Guilfoyle, supra note 43, at 7 (arguing that the use of 
“applicable” refers to the international humanitarian law that would otherwise apply). Given that force 
on land in Somalia was within the scope of authority of Resolution 1851, a more persuasive reading 
would be to give the Council’s words operative effect in the context of what actions were being 
authorized versus explaining them away or dismissing them as a mere contingency. 
 51.  See Hampson, supra note 12. 
 52.  S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, ¶ 6. 
 53.  See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Authorizes States to Use Land-Based 
Operations in Somalia, as Part of Fight Against Piracy Off Coast, Unanimously Adopting 1851, U.N. 
Press Release SC/9541 (Dec. 16, 2008) [hereinafter Press Release SC/9541]. 
 54.  See S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, ¶ 2 (calling on states to deploy naval vessels and military 
aircraft, but not specifically ground forces).  Even so, Paragraph 2 calls upon states “to take part 
actively in the fight against piracy . . . consistent with this resolution and international law,” which 
recognizes the creation of additional authority in Res. 1851. Id. It also authorizes “seizure and 
disposition of boats, vessels, arms and other related equipment used in the commission of piracy and 
armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, or for which there are reasonable grounds for suspecting 
such use,” notably without geographic reference. Id. Therefore, destroying “boats, vessels, arms and 
other related equipment” in Somali territory is consistent with Paragraph 2. 
 55.  Throughout this article, “materiel” is used to refer to pirates’ “boats, vessels, arms and other 
related equipment” referenced in S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, ¶ 2. 
 56.  For a discussion of the standards for seizure and destruction of pirates’ materiel under 
UNCLOS and S.C. Res. 2077, see Matteo Crippa, Liability for the Destruction of Suspected 
Pirate Skiffs?, COMMUNIS HOSTIS OMNIUM (Jan. 3, 2013), http://piracy-law.com/2013/01/04/is-there-a-
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therefore, authorizes at least the destruction of the materiel needed by 
pirates to execute their violent acts. 
Second, the Council members’ explanations of votes offer strong 
support for the notion that military force on land is authorized.  The United 
Kingdom representative, David Miliband, explained that “[t]he 
authorization conferred by Paragraph 6 . . . enabled States and regional 
organizations to act with force, if necessary, on land in 
Somalia.”57  Additionally, using the language of IHL, he further noted that 
the “use of force, however, must be both necessary and proportionate.”58  
Representative Jan Grauls of Belgium noted that the “resolution allowed 
combat against piracy both on sea and land.”59 
Even those wary of the relevant provision acknowledged that it 
allowed the use of force on land.  Representative Dumisani Kumalo of 
South Africa “expressed concern over the provision in the resolution that 
allowed for States to conduct land-based operations against piracy, saying 
there was a danger that innocent Somalis could fall victim to those 
operations.”60  This statement suggests that Council members considered 
unintended loss of innocent life consistent with the doctrine of double-
effect.61 
For the United States, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated that 
“pursuing pirates on land would have a significant impact,” and that 
“[m]aritime operations alone were insufficient for combating piracy.”62  
Some Council members expressed a further desire for a U.N. peacekeeping 
force in Somalia with both “maritime and land elements.”63  Council 
members were notably impacted by Somalia’s strong support for 
Resolution 1851, underscoring the resolution’s international legitimacy.64 
Third, the application of force ashore by the European Union in the 
spring of 2012, coupled with a lack of international protest and implied 
ratification by both the Somali government and the Security Council, add a 
 
liability-for-the-destruction-of-suspected-pirate-skiffs/. 
 57. Press Release SC/9541, supra note 53. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  The doctrine of double-effect allows for the possibility of harm as an unintended consequence 
of the pursuit of a just or lawful course of action. See SHADIA B. DRURY, AQUINAS AND MODERNITY: 
THE LOST PROMISE OF NATURAL LAW 67–68 (Rowman & Littlefield, 2008). 
 62.  Press Release SC/9541, supra note 53. 
 63.  Id. (“Egypt looked forward to having the Security Council study the option of deploying a 
United Nations peacekeeping force in Somalia, to act as a “safety valve,” with the possibility of 
exploring ways to enhance the peacekeeping force with both “maritime and land elements.”). 
 64.  Id.  See also GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 11, at 84–85. 
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highly persuasive historical gloss to the text of Resolution 1851. The 
EUNAVFOR’s destruction of several fiberglass skiffs on the beach in 
Haradheere was widely reported in May of 2012.65  Months later, the 
Somali government requested continued assistance from the international 
community, and the Council passed Resolution 2077 in November 2012, 
renewing the authorization in Paragraph 6 of Resolution 1851 for a further 
twelve months.66  This implied ratification of military action by both the 
Somali government and the Security Council compels an interpretation that 
the use of force on land is authorized, at least with regard to the destruction 
of “boats, vessels, arms and other related equipment” when there are 
reasonable grounds for suspecting their use in piracy.67 
Despite this evidence, some commentators have been reticent to 
acknowledge the full force of the Security Council’s decision.  Some have 
concluded that Resolution 1851 merely continues a law enforcement 
paradigm, and that Paragraph 6 possibly “envisages operations in which 
external actors engage in law enforcement activities in the territory of a 
failed state. . . .”68  One commentator noted that the “shift from a military 
to a law-enforcement paradigm is particularly pronounced with Resolution 
1851.”69  While Resolution 1851 does speak to increased cooperation and 
action in the realm of prosecution, it seems that the weight of the evidence 
supports the conclusion that military force was envisioned as a necessary 
measure for combating piracy at sea.70 
 
 65.  See, e.g., Gettleman, supra note 1. 
 66.  S.C. Res. 2077, supra note 35, ¶ 12. This authorization was further renewed in S.C. Res. 
2125, supra note 9. 
 67.  S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, ¶ 2; S.C. Res. 2077, supra note 35, ¶ 10. 
 68.  See GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 11, at 132–33. Geiss and Petrig refer to the “overall aim of 
ensuring the long term security of international navigation off the coast of Somalia,” and the emphasis 
on effectively investigating and prosecuting piracy as a crime as support for the argument that the law 
enforcement paradigm was confirmed in Resolution 1851. Id. Though they acknowledge that counter-
piracy operations “could eventually reach the threshold of non-international armed conflict, thereby 
triggering the application of [IHL],” they fail to acknowledge the strong indications that force was 
authorized. Id. Resolution 1851 was not the first Security Council action addressing piracy off the coast 
of Somalia. Clearly, Paragraph 6 indicates that more aggressive action needed to be taken. See S.C. Res. 
1851, supra note 9. Further, the Resolution’s purpose of “suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery 
at sea,” does not particularly support the argument that the Security Council “confirmed the law 
enforcement paradigm.” Id. Instead, the argument likely supported by that premise is that the Security 
Council recognized the link in Paragraph 6 between action ashore and suppressing acts of piracy at sea, 
and that it chose to take more decisive action against pirates. 
 69.  See Douglas Guilfoyle, Piracy off Somalia: a sketch of the legal framework, BLOG OF THE 
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Apr. 20, 2009), http://www.ejiltalk.org/piracy-off-
somalia-a-sketch-of-the-legal-framework. 
 70.  Id. Other scholars have significantly limited their analysis of the full implications of 
Resolution 1851. See, e.g., Milena Sterio, International Law in Crisis: Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia, 
44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 291, 295 (2011) (“. . . to chase pirates after the original piracy encounter, 
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Because of the plain language of Resolution 1851, the clearly 
expressed intent of the Security Council members that the text conveys the 
authorization to use force, and the implied ratification of forcible measures 
actually taken, the use of authorized force in Somalia is consistent with the 
limitations set forth in the Resolution.71 
B. Consent of the sovereign 
Within its territory, a sovereign state—Somalia in this case—generally 
retains ultimate authority under international law and could invite other 
states to cooperate or to act independently in a wide range of scenarios.72  
Under international law, the sovereign retains ultimate accountability under 
this scenario to ensure that applicable human rights norms are followed.73 
Outside of that broad and general restriction, the sovereign retains 
control to determine the character of international assistance taken pursuant 
to its consent.  This becomes relevant when looking at the law applicable to 
any action taken under such consent, as we will see in the following section 
on the law applicable to the use of force in Somali territory. 
In addition to stipulations, Somalia could determine whether such 
actions were strictly law enforcement in nature, or assist in determining 
 
and to even enter Somali land.”) 
 71.  With the caveats that are listed in Paragraph 6, as described S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9. 
 72.  Although not without its problems, the perception that the Somali government is non-
functioning is not widely accepted.  The new Somali Federal Government took over from a transitional 
government in August 2012, and has stepped into the previous role of the TFG. While previous Security 
Council Resolutions referenced the TFG, the most recent resolution only references the “new Somali 
government.” See Somali Leaders Back New Constitution, BBC NEWS (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.bbc. 
co.uk/news/world-africa-19075685; see also James Fergusson, Somalia: A Failed State Is Back From 
The Dead, THE INDEPENDENT, Jan. 13, 2013, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/somalia-
a-failed-state-is-back-from-the-dead-8449310.html. So, while this section applies Security Council 
action to Somalia only in the broader context, the framework for analysis could be looked at even more 
generally. Land-based piracy networks have existed before, and there is some evidence that they are 
becoming more prevalent in different parts of the world, though admittedly not on the scale seen in the 
Horn of Africa. 
 73.  See Ashley S. Deeks, Consent to the Use of Force and International Law Supremacy, 54 
HARV. INT’L LAW J. 1, 6–10 (2013); see also U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions, Study on targeted killings, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (“The 
proposition that a State may consent to the use of force on its territory by another State is not legally 
controversial. But while consent may permit the use of force, it does not absolve either of the concerned 
States from their obligations to abide by human rights law and IHL with respect to the use of lethal 
force against a specific person. The consenting State’s responsibility to protect those on its territory 
from arbitrary deprivation of the right to life applies at all times.  A consenting State may only lawfully 
authorize a killing by the targeting State to the extent that the killing is carried out in accordance with 
applicable IHL or human rights law.”) citing International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, 
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Resolution on the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, G.A. Res. 51/191, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. 
A/Res/51/191 (Dec. 16, 1996). 
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whether pirates constituted an armed insurgency, depending on the relevant 
facts.  Somalia could clarify the relevance of Somali law to the action 
against pirate camps, and also the status of individuals associated with 
foreign armed forces and governments in Somalia, including their potential 
liability under Somali law for acts taken that don’t go as planned. 
While there is no current indication that Somalia has provided specific 
consent to any individual state to use force ashore to suppress piracy, its 
consent provided the foundation for Resolution 1851.74  The Security 
Council specifically referenced this consent in the Resolution, adding that 
its authorization under Chapter VII was not intended to create any new 
norm of customary international law.75  Thus, consent is currently in place, 
but it is exercised via the Security Council rather than potentially more 
cumbersome bilateral or multilateral agreements with other states. 
C. Self-defense 
Though the Security Council has authorized the use of force ashore in 
Somalia, force could still be justified in the absence of such authorization 
under certain limited circumstances.  If a state’s military forces or vessels 
sailing under its flag were subject to an armed attack, it would have the 
right under international law to respond with necessary and proportional 
force in self-defense.76  Although the U.N. Charter forbids the use of 
force,77 nothing impairs the right to act in self-defense “if an armed attack 
occurs against” a member state.78  Necessary and proportional force could 
include the authority to take action to eliminate the threat, as long as the 
pirates are still demonstrating an imminent hostile intent.79 
More difficult questions arise when pirates operating ashore present 
an imminent threat to U.S. vessels and U.S. persons at sea.80  The 
 
 74.  Press Release SC/9541, supra note 53; see also S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, ¶ 6. 
 75.  Press Release SC/9541, supra note 53; see also Treves, supra note 32, at 406 (“Indeed, the 
activities purportedly ‘authorized’ by the Security Council in light of the coastal state’s authorization 
could also be conducted in the absence of a Security Council resolution adopted within the framework 
of Chapter VII.”). 
 76.  U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 77.  U.N. Charter art. 51, ¶ 4. 
 78.  U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 79.  See Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad, Resurrecting “Romantics at War”: International Self-
Defense in the Shadow of the Law of War—Where Are the Borders?, 13 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 205, 
219 (2006) (“[t]he permissible use of force is limited to acts of state self-defense, which can be 
performed only in response to an armed attack, including an imminent threat to amount to an armed 
attack.”). 
 80.  See Daniel Pines, Maritime Piracy: Changes in U.S. Law Needed to Combat This Critical 
National Security Concern, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 69, 81 (2012) (“In just the past few years, pirates 
have attacked U.S. vessels on several occasions. The attack on the Alabama described in the 
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resolution of these complex questions of self-defense is beyond the scope 
of this analysis.  The issue is only highlighted here as a possible 
justification for the use of force under very narrow circumstances.81  As of 
now, self-defense has not been advanced as a viable justification for the use 
of force on land to suppress piracy, and there is no indication that the 
EUNAVFOR relied on self-defense to support recent actions taken 
ashore.82 
Indeed, under international law, a sovereign state retains the primary 
responsibility and authority for the maintenance of law and order in its land 
territory.83  Issues such as pursuit or the use of force ashore, in a self-
defense scenario, would likely only arise in a hostage-rescue or ship-rescue 
scenario when the sovereign was either unable or unwilling to take the 
necessary action to eliminate the threat posed to the victim-state’s forces, 
vessels, or nationals.84 
Thus, although there are at least three possible justifications under 
international law that would support the use of force in Somali land 
territory to suppress piracy, the Security Council’s action to authorize force 
(with various restrictions) is the most relevant to the current situation.85  
The next section analyzes what body of law would apply to give practical 
 
introduction is just one example. Other examples include two separate pirate attacks on U.S. military 
vessels in 2010 near Somalia, where the pirates in both cases believed the vessels to be merchant ships.”  
(internal citations omitted)). Additionally, the notion that an “imminent threat” justifies the use of force 
in self-defense is not without controversy. See, e.g., Daniel Bethlehem, Principles Relevant to the Scope 
of a State’s Right of Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Non-State Actors, 
106 AM. J. INT’L L. 769 (2012). 
 81.  Beyond response to an armed attack, the special case of hostage rescue may serve as an 
additional narrow justification for the use of force ashore to rescue nationals held as hostages, but again, 
only if the sovereign were unable or unwilling to adequately protect the hostages or deal with the 
situation. See Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice: General Course in Public 
International Law, 178 RECUEIL DES COURS 145 (1982) (“General Scranton, the U.S. representative to 
the UN in 1976, stated, in the context of a debate about Israel’s use of force in Uganda to rescue its 
nationals, “Israel’s action in rescuing the hostages necessarily involved a temporary breach of the 
territorial integrity of Uganda. Normally, such a breach would be impermissible under the Charter of 
the United Nations. However, there is a well-established right to use limited force for the protection of 
one’s own nationals either from an imminent threat of injury or death in a situation where the state in 
whose territory they are located is either unwilling or unable to protect them.”). 
 82.  See Gettleman, supra note 1. 
 83. See Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward A Normative Framework for 
Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483, 504 (2012) (“In the best-case scenario, the 
territorial state is willing and able to suppress the threat. In that case, the victim state achieves its goal 
without expending resources, and the territorial state preserves its sovereignty.”). 
 84.  See id. at 489 (“The fact that states currently are acclimated to using the “unwilling or unable” 
test suggests that any other test would have to overcome a high bar to become the preferred test, a 
hurdle no other option is poised to meet.”) 
 85.  S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, ¶ 2; S.C. Res. 2125, supra note 9. 
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effect to the Council’s decision. 
II. LAW APPLICABLE TO THE USE OF FORCE IN SOMALIA 
As described above, the U.N. Security Council has authorized the use 
of force in Somali territory “for the purpose of suppressing acts of piracy 
and armed robbery at sea.”86  The use of such force in the territory of 
another sovereign state must be undertaken pursuant to law—but what law?  
This section addresses whether international humanitarian law applies to 
the use of force ashore in Somalia to carry out the mandate of Security 
Council. 
The conclusion is not straightforward. Depending on how U.N. 
member states undertake a complex and fact-intensive analysis, the 
situation may or may not rise to the level of an armed conflict.  IHL clearly 
applies during armed conflict.87  But notwithstanding such a conclusion, 
this section argues that IHL should apply in any case to this “gray zone” 
conflict.  The Security Council is competent to declare IHL applicable, and 
IHL is the lex specialis that is best suited to giving practical effect to the 
Council’s decision while ensuring humanitarian protections. 
According to Resolution 1851, enforcement measures taken in 
Somalia must be “consistent with applicable international humanitarian and 
human rights law.”88  It was noted in Part I that this reference to both IHL, 
the law that applies during armed conflict, as well as the more generally 
applicable human rights law, is significant because it implies that force is 
authorized.89  It is also significant, though, for its plain-language invocation 
of “applicable IHL” to “all necessary measures” authorized ashore.90  At 
the same time, the invocation of “human rights law” cannot be ignored, and 
I note potential areas of overlap below. 
We must first determine how to characterize the ongoing conflict in 
Somalia and off its coast between the organized groups of armed pirate-
fighters on one side,91 and the U.N. member states carrying out the Security 
 
 86.  See S. C. Res. 1851, supra note 9; Hampson, supra note 12. 
 87.  See Hampson, supra note 12, at 550. 
 88.  S. C. Res. 1851, supra note 9. 
 89.  See also GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 11, at 131–32. 
 90.  S. C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, ¶ 6. 
 91.  Throughout this section the term “pirate-fighter” refers to a member of an organized armed 
network of sea-going pirates and shore-based fighters, including their leaders, financiers, facilitators 
and hostage-keepers ashore, the captains of “motherships” and logistics suppliers at sea, and the 
seafarers who launch attacks. Though the full extent of Somali pirate-fighter coordination and 
organization is disputed (and analyzed below), this shorthand is merely used to distinguish organized 
and networked pirates who are managed ashore from the more straightforward definition of piracy as an 
international crime under UNCLOS, supra note 15, art. 101. 
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Council’s mandate on the other.  This question gives rise to three potential 
scenarios. 
First, a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) could be found to 
exist, thus clearly invoking “applicable IHL.”92  Second, there might be a 
scenario in which the hostilities fall short of a NIAC, but IHL is 
nonetheless determined to apply.  Finally, if IHL were determined not to 
apply, the military force authorized by the Security Council would need to 
be governed by other existing law, including human rights law and Somali 
domestic law.  This latter case may present gaps that prevent the full 
mandate of the Council from being realized. 
I address each of these scenarios in turn.  Additionally, throughout the 
analysis I examine how both sets of legal frameworks present challenges, 
and suggest some ways to overcome those challenges. 
A.  If a NIAC were to exist, IHL would clearly apply 
Notwithstanding any legal justification for the use of force, IHL would 
normally only apply to the use of such force if the situation falls into one of 
two “law triggering” scenarios—international armed conflict (IAC), or 
NIAC.93  IAC can quickly be dismissed because it presupposes the use of 
armed force between two or more states.94  Even though U.N. member 
states might be using force in Somalia, any use of such force would be 
aligned with the sovereign government of Somalia, not against it.95  
Member states would be acting with the consent of the Somali government 
against a non-state group in their territory,96 which could be considered a 
 
 92.  As a subset of this scenario, the organized pirate-fighters could be associated with an existing, 
already-recognized NIAC in Somalia, that is, Al Shabaab. This scenario is explored in Section B.2, 
infra. 
 93.  See Articles 2 and 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 [hereinafter Common 
Article 2, Common Article 3]. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, opened for signature, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and 
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, opened for signature, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, 
opened for signature, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, opened for signature, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
 94.  See Common Article 2, supra note 93. 
 95.  Though the Security Council has consistently authorized such measures “in Somalia,” they 
have always been done pursuant to the request of the Somali government. See S.C. Res. 2125, supra 
note 9. 
 96.  Indeed, Resolution 1851 implies that the Somali government must consent to specific actions 
taken ashore in their territory. See S. C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, ¶ 6 (noting that all necessary measures 
are authorized, inter alia, “for which advance notification has been provided by the TFG to the 
Secretary-General”). 
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NIAC if certain conditions are met.  If a NIAC were to exist, the body of 
IHL applicable in that type of conflict clearly would apply. 
This section first examines the factors used to determine the existence 
of a NIAC.  Second, it turns to some challenges in applying the existing 
NIAC framework to the unique scenario of armed, land-based groups of 
pirate-fighters in Somalia.  Finally, if the IHL applicable to NIAC is found 
to apply to the conflict, this section briefly addresses how the most relevant 
principles of that body of IHL would be applied. 
1. Is there a NIAC? 
Whether a NIAC exists is a question of fact.97  Under the Geneva 
Conventions, non-international armed conflicts are those “not of an 
international character occurring in the territory of one of the High 
Contracting Parties . . . .”98  Following calls for greater clarity, this 
definition was significantly refined with the entry into force of Additional 
Protocol II (AP II) in 1978.99  Under that treaty, a NIAC would only be 
found to exist if a conflict occurring within a state is between its forces and 
“other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, 
exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry 
out sustained and concerted military operations . . . .”100  Further, AP II 
specifically does not apply to “situations of internal disturbances and 
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts 
of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts.”101 
Strictly under the AP II definition, the Security Council’s authorized 
force against organized armed pirates in Somalia would likely fall short of 
the criteria for a NIAC.102  It would hit several wickets, though.  Because 
they are hierarchically organized, pirate-fighter networks might be 
considered “organized armed groups” who operate from discrete bases 
 
 97.  See INT’L L. ASSOC., FINAL REPORT ON THE MEANING OF ARMED CONFLICT IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 (2010). 
 98.  See Common Article 3, supra note 93. 
 99.  See Anthony Cullen, Key Developments Affecting the Scope of Internal Armed Conflict in 
International Humanitarian Law, 183 MIL. L. REV. 66, 91–92 (2005), citing INT’L COMM. OF THE RED 
CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, 1325 (1987). 
 100.  Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 
Dec. 1978, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 Annex II, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  While Somalia is not a party to AP II, many of its provisions are considered to be customary 
international law. Additionally, the obligations of U.N. member states under AP II would possibly be 
implicated by their participation in any NIAC. For the purpose of this analysis, I assume that IHL would 
apply to any NIAC occurring in Somalia. 
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ashore.103  Pirates systematically launch coordinated attacks on merchant 
ships with tactics and weapons that could be considered as part of 
“sustained and concerted military operations.”104  Additionally, pirate-
fighters don’t clearly invoke any of the scenarios specifically excepted 
from the AP II definition.  There is no significant internal disturbance; 
rather, their force in attacking ships is dedicated, directed, and lethal.105  
Their violence is not “isolated and sporadic”—indeed, even ashore, their 
keeping of hostage-prisoners is protracted and planned.106 
But there are significant challenges to such a characterization.  The 
definition of NIAC espoused in AP II, by its text, applies to organized 
armed groups that fight the government.107  Somali pirates do not generally 
engage in belligerent acts with government forces.  Instead, they use 
violence against civilian ships at sea.  Additionally, pirate-fighters do not 
fit the traditional NIAC narrative of insurgents seeking political change. 
They are in all likelihood motivated by private gain, although their true 
motivations are not entirely clear.  While subjective motivations for 
violence are not strictly part of the AP II definition, in this case they form 
part of a narrative that is sometimes used to justify pirates’ violent acts. 
It is difficult to conclusively determine how much these unique 
distinctions cause trouble with fitting the case of shore-based pirate-fighter 
networks into the definition of NIAC under international law.  I return to 
these unique characteristics later, but I first analyze how well other 
attributes of the potential conflict fit within the current law defining NIAC.  
Beyond AP II, international tribunals and subsequent treaties have created a 
more detailed framework to consider.108  The most widely cited case that 
expands on the definition of NIAC is from the International Criminal 
 
 103.  It is also not clear whether organized groups of pirate-fighters would meet the AP II 
requirements of being “under responsible command . . . and [being able] to implement [the] Protocol.” 
AP II, supra note 100, art. 1. This is addressed further in Part II.A.1.a.2 infra.  See also PARTNERSHIP & 
ACTION PLAN, supra note 20. 
 104.  AP II, supra note 100. 
 105.  See IMO Piracy Report, supra note 4. 
 106.  See Singh, supra note 7. 
 107.  See AP II, supra note 11, art. 1(1) (stating that the Protocol applies “between [the state’s] 
armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups”). This treaty-based 
definition has since been expanded by international criminal tribunals to include fighting between 
organized armed groups. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defence 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 
2, 1995) (“[W]e find that an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between 
States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or 
between such groups within a State.”). 
 108.  See Karl Josef Partsch, Armed Conflict, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
¶ 26 (Rudolf Bernhardt, ed., 1992). 
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Tribunal for Yugoslavia—Prosecutor v. Tadic.109  The case is noteworthy 
not only for its detailed analysis of the threshold of NIAC, but also for its 
broad acceptance.110  The Tadic decision on jurisdiction is widely 
considered to reflect customary international law,111  and parts of the 
holding were ultimately codified in Art. 8(2)(f) of the Rome Statute.112 
a. Tadic factors 
In Tadic, two factors were analyzed to determine whether a de facto 
armed conflict existed: the intensity of the hostilities, and the organization 
of the parties to the conflict.113  Each is addressed in turn. 
1. Intensity of the conflict 
The pirates’ violent acts at sea and on shore likely satisfy the 
“intensity of the hostilities” threshold that the Court articulated in Tadic.114  
In evaluating the level of hostilities, the Court focused “on the protracted 
nature of the conflict vice [sic] the magnitude of the attacks.”115  But even 
the magnitude of the pirates’ protracted hostilities is significant.  A recent 
U.N. report noted that “[i]n 2011, using better and heavier weapons, pirates 
have targeted more oil tankers and sailing vessels. Violence against 
seafarers has also increased.”116  The type of weapon used is one indicator 
 
 109. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 163–70 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999); see also Cullen, supra note 99, at 98 (“[Tadic] 
considerably influenced the development of international humanitarian law.”). 
 110.  Tadic, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 163–70; Cullen, supra note 99, at 98. 
 111.  See Ian Corey, The Fine Line Between Policy and Custom: Prosecutor v. Tadic and the 
Customary International Law of Internal Armed Conflict, 166 MIL. L. REV. 145, 155 (2000) (“the 
[Tadic] court seemed to conclude that such pronouncements evidenced both practice and opinio juris by 
implication.”). 
 112.  See Anthony Cullen, The Parameters of Internal Armed Conflict in International 
Humanitarian Law, 12 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 189, 206 (2004)  (“The Tadic formula for the 
recognition of internal armed conflict is included, albeit slightly amended, in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court.”). By its inclusion, it ultimately governs whether a NIAC exists for the 
purpose of determining liability for war crimes. 
 113.  See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
 114.  This section looks only at the “absolute value” of hostilities and sets aside the issue that the 
hostilities are addressed in the “axis” between the pirates and ships at sea (versus between the pirates 
and government forces or possibly another armed group). This anomaly is addressed separately. 
 115.  ANTHONY CULLEN, THE CONCEPT OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 127 (2010) (“It is clear that the intensity required for the 
existence of armed conflict is above that of internal disturbances and tensions. It is also clear that 
hostilities need not reach the magnitude of ‘sustained and concerned military operations.’ The issue is 
one of clarifying the threshold of intensity that is required for the characterization of a situation as one 
of armed conflict. This degree of intensity hinges on the interpretation of the word ‘protracted.’”). 
 116.  Res. 1950 Report, supra note 5, ¶ 9. 
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of whether an armed conflict exists.117  In this case, the weapons used by 
pirates rise to the level of crew-served weapons, and have inflicted damage 
on naval warships.118 
Focusing specifically on the “protracted nature of the conflict,” 
organized pirate-fighters have controlled vast areas of the sea off the coast 
of Somalia for several years.  In 2008, the Security Council first expressed 
grave concern over “the threat that acts of piracy and armed robbery 
against vessels pose to the prompt, safe and effective delivery of 
humanitarian aid to Somalia, the safety of commercial maritime routes and 
to international navigation,” and deplored the “recent incidents of attacks 
upon and hijacking of vessels.”119  Since then, the Council has addressed 
the issue in terms of a threat to international peace and security twelve 
times.120  The scope of the authorized response has also progressed.121 
Further, there is good reason that the current lull in the violence 
should not save pirate-fighters from a conclusion that hostilities are still 
protracted and ongoing.  Bases, materials, and equipment still render them 
capable of escalating their attacks, and they still actively hold ships for 
ransom and keep captives ashore.122  The intensity of the hostilities could 
be seen as extending to the ruthless treatment of hostages and prisoners, 
and to the widespread practice of employing children in low-level pirate 
attacks.123 
Thus, the combination of sustained attacks at sea using military 
hardware and tactics since at least 2008, coupled with a robust and violent 
shore-based hostage network, makes the pirate conflict fall readily within 
the Tadic threshold for the intensity of the conflict. 
2. Organization of the parties 
The difficulty in gathering reliable open-source data regarding pirate 
network operations makes it ultimately unclear whether pirates would meet 
the substantive requirements of an “organized armed group,” which is the 
second threshold question for a NIAC under Tadic.124  According to U.N. 
 
 117.  See Prosecutor v. Haradinij, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 49, 60 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008). 
 118.  See Suspected Pirates Nabbed After Skirmish with U.S. Navy Ship, CNN (Apr. 1, 2010), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/04/01/navy.pirates/index.html. 
 119.  See supra note 35. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  See S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, ¶ 2; S.C. Res. 2077, supra note 35, ¶ 10. 
 122.  See Singh, supra note 7. 
 123.  Res. 1950 Report, supra note 5, ¶ 35. 
 124.  See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
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reports, pirate clans fall under responsible commands in a hierarchical 
structure, although it is not clear how much coordination is done between 
various clans.125 Clans of pirates “exud[e] cold ruthlessness and 
demonstrat[e] a proclivity for torture and violence.”126  Pirate leaders have 
even given statements to the press from their lawless enclaves, in one case 
claiming that they cannot be stopped.127  In the context of prosecutions, the 
U.S. has claimed the need to target the “upper tiers of the pirate hierarchy,” 
and demonstrate “that individuals beyond the gunmen in skiffs are 
culpable . . . .”128  Their organization is further underscored by their 
development of a piracy “stock exchange.”129 
Furthermore, pirate clans operate from discrete bases along the coast 
of Somalia, and operate in designated areas both on land and at sea.  Armed 
pirate groups exercise de facto control over their territory.130  Indeed, this 
control is what has allowed them to function outside the law in the first 
place. 
Thus, although a lack of reliable information impedes a clear 
conclusion, significant indicators exist that the pirates’ level of 
organization meets the threshold contemplated in Tadic.  U.N. member 
states undertaking such analyses, furthermore, would likely have greater 
means at their disposal, including discrete intelligence collection, to make a 
more specific and credible determination. 
3. Challenges to applying the Tadic framework 
The Tadic decision is commonly viewed as having expanded the 
number of conflicts considered to be a NIAC, as compared with the 
definition in AP II.131  While it certainly seems to offer a more holistic 
 
 125.  See Joshua Hammer, Tracking Somali Pirates to Their Lair, N.Y.TIMES, Aug. 5, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/07/books/review/the-pirates-of-somalia-by-jay-bahadur-book-
review.html (“The organizational structure of typical pirate cells . . . includes not just attackers, 
interpreters, accountants and cooks: almost every group also has its supplier of khat, . . . high or low, 
these brigands practice some peculiar rituals. After receiving his cut of the ransom on the captured ship, 
one pirate tells Bahadur, each man must toss his mobile phone into the ocean—a precaution to make 
sure no one can call ahead to his kin to arrange an ambush of his fellow cell members.”). 
 126.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 127.  See David McKenzie, No way to stop us, pirate leader says, CNN (Dec. 4, 2008), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2008-12-01/world/pirate.interview_1_international-maritime-bureau-somali-
coast-pirate-attacks. 
 128.  See Andrew J. Shapiro, Turning the Tide on Somali Piracy, Remarks to the Atlantic Council 
(Oct. 26, 2012). 
 129.  See Sterling, supra note 22. 
 130. Res. 1950 Report, supra note 5, ¶ 14 (“Recently, ‘Galmudug’ has become one of the most 
prolific pirate bases. The ‘Galmudug’ counter-piracy task force has expressed its intention to develop a 
maritime police unit both on and off shore.”). 
 131.  Cullen, supra note 99, at 108–09. 
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framework for analysis, it still doesn’t lead to a firm conclusion that the use 
of force under Resolution 1851 against Somali pirate-fighters would rise to 
that level.  The two problems first introduced above—the direction of 
hostilities to sea (versus toward the government), and the motive for private 
gain—still present unique concerns with labeling it “armed conflict.”  
While it is ultimately unclear how these two additional nuances would 
change the analysis under Tadic, there is a strong case to be made that they 
should not disrupt an otherwise reasonable conclusion that the scenario 
constitutes a NIAC. 
Although pirates target civilian ships at sea instead of government 
forces, there are two reasons that this should not save them from being 
considered capable of engaging in a NIAC if other required criteria are 
satisfied. First, the pirates’ hostilities must be viewed in the context of their 
base of operations: Somalia, a country of widespread and relative (though 
recently improving) lawlessness.132  The presence of armed pirate fighters 
presents a hostile threat to the government’s authority, even though they 
may not be actively fighting government troops.  The complexity of 
organized pirate operations strongly suggests that they operate with 
impunity in the areas they control.133  They have used bases on land (as 
well as vessels docked directly offshore) to hold dozens of hostages in 
inhumane conditions.134  Thus, hostilities between the pirates and 
government forces can be considered “latent.”  Their organization and 
control presents a hostile threat to the government’s authority and the rule 
of law.  The government is unable to respond, but if it were to engage in 
hostilities with the armed pirate clans, those activities would likely be 
considered NIAC.  Therefore, U.N. member states should be seen as 
stepping into the government’s role (and a potential NIAC) when carrying 
out the Security Council’s decision in Resolution 1851 and using force 
consistent with the Somali government’s request. 
Second, international tribunals have not held that participation by 
government forces is required, AP II notwithstanding.135  In Tadic, the 
Court was confronted with a determination of whether a novel situation 
was included in the definition of armed conflict, one in which “no 
government party is involved because two or more non-state entities are 
 
 132.  See UN experts on use of mercenaries urge greater oversight for private security contractors, 
UNITED NATIONS NEWS CENTER REPORT (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp 
?NewsID=43797#.UYHCDbWR98E. 
 133.  See PLOCH ET AL., supra note 8, at 10–11. 
 134.  See KAIJA HURLBURT ET AL., THE HUMAN COST OF SOMALI PIRACY REPORT, 7–8 (2012). 
 135.  AP II, supra note 100, art. 1(1). 
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fighting each other.”136  The Court signaled that the involvement of a 
government actor was not a necessary criterion for a NIAC as long as the 
organization of the parties and level of the hostilities were sufficient to 
meet the required thresholds.  It would follow, then, that if, hypothetically, 
the civilian ships attacked by pirates fought back (thereby reciprocating 
hostilities), the scenario would more closely approach the criteria for 
NIAC.137  The attacking of defenseless civilian vessels—which are never 
considered lawful targets of attack—instead of another fighting force 
should not save pirates from being considered as involved in a NIAC if 
other relevant criteria are satisfied.  The pirate-fighters’ unlawful holding 
of civilian prisoners and attacks on civilian targets could be seen as types of 
“war crimes” that, on account of their magnitude, should be considered in 
the analysis.  In evaluating a traditional “rebel-on-state” NIAC, the 
“intensity of the hostilities” would likely consider the magnitude of any 
unlawful acts of violence, in addition to the hostilities engaging state 
forces.138  It seems unusual that the potential war crimes of pirate-fighters 
(that is, the targeting innocent civilians) would not be considered in the 
magnitude of hostilities simply because they also happen to be crimes of 
universal jurisdiction under international law. 
While pirates’ primary aim is commonly accepted to be financial gain, 
their purported lack of political motivation should not render them 
incapable of engaging in NIAC.139  There are two reasons for this.  First, it 
has no foundation in IHL.140  Second, it is contrary to at least some pirates’ 
claimed justification for their actions.141 
Neither AP II nor the Tadic definitions, nor any other instrument of 
 
 136.  See CULLEN, supra note 115, at 119. 
 137.  This limited hypothetical is for illustration purposes only. Any involvement in hostilities on 
the part of pirated vessels would need to be organized in order to rise to the level of a NIAC, and it 
would present the additional complication of shifting the dynamic to one vis-à-vis the pirate-fighters 
and their victim ships, versus the relevant dynamic of pirate-fighters vis-à-vis the Somali government 
combined with other states enforcing relevant U.N. Security Council Resolutions. 
 138.  See also Prosecutor v. Mrkšić, et al., Case No. IT-95-13/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 407 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2007) (“[factors for evaluating the intensity of the conflict 
include] the seriousness of attacks and potential increase in armed clashes, their spread over territory 
and over a period of time, the increase in the number of government forces, the mobilisation and the 
distribution of weapons among both parties to the conflict, as well as whether the conflict has attracted 
the attention of the United Nations Security Council, and if so whether any resolutions on the matter 
have been passed.”). 
 139.  The overlap with liability under criminal law for pirates’ actions is addressed further, infra. 
 140.  See Sylvain Vité, Typology of armed conflicts in international humanitarian law: legal 
concepts and actual situations, 91 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 69, 78 (Mar. 2009). 
 141.  See Rep. of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Legal Issues Related to Piracy off 
the Coast of Somalia, ¶ 90, U.N. Doc. S/2011/30 (Jan. 25, 2011) (Jack Lang) [hereinafter Lang Report]. 
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IHL, speaks to the subjective motive of an “other organized group” for 
espousing violence.142  Nonetheless, pirates are sometimes given a reflexive 
“pass” because their goals are perceived to be mere subsistence in 
admittedly one of the most challenging domestic economies in the world.143  
Some commentators have even justified pirates’ violence.144  But focusing 
solely on the pirates’ supposed profit motive is contrary to some pirates’ 
claimed intent.  Adopting a model pirates themselves have advocated, they 
do, in fact, have political objectives—to protect the Somali coast and 
eliminate foreign influence, including dumping.145  Ironically, giving 
pirates the status that they themselves seem to desire makes them more 
likely to be considered an organized fighting force with a common mission 
and the desire to employ hostilities to achieve it.146  This seems to push 
them closer to the customary international law definition of NIAC as 
reflected in Tadic. 
Thus, concerns that the pirates’ motives or chosen victims make the 
existence of a NIAC less likely would be largely misplaced.147  These two 
challenges can be accommodated by the AP II definition amplified by the 
Tadic framework.  Broader implications of this possible gap in the NIAC 
framework are explored next. 
b. Problems presented by the pirate-fighter case to the definition of 
NIAC 
Those who have analyzed the case of Somali piracy have all 
concluded that a NIAC does not currently exist.148  The question, however, 
 
 142.  See CULLEN, supra note 115, at 130–31. 
 143.  See, e.g., Guilfoyle, supra note 43, at 6 (implying an analogy with displaced persons who 
“cross a land border and begin hijacking trucks, to make a living following the destruction of their farm 
lands. In such a case we would not seriously contend that such displaced persons were in any sense 
acting as belligerents.”). 
 144.  Nicole Stillwell, Robbers or Robinhoods?: A Study of the Somali Piracy Crisis and A Call to 
Develop an International Framework to Combat Maritime Terrorism, 7 LOY. MAR. L.J. 127, 134–35 
(2009) (“These detainees are being charged with piracy, although not all Somali attacks are piracy per 
se. Somalis do not always act for private ends. Somalis act to defend their coasts and support their 
communities. Additionally, their attacks are not only on the high seas, but also in their coastal waters 
and exclusive economic zones.  They are supported by local government and their community. Finally, 
their attacks originated as a means to provide support and protection in the absence of government.  
Thus, the incidents in Somalia do not resemble piracy pursuant to the definitions under UNCLOS.”). 
 145.  See, e.g., Lang Report, supra note 141, ¶¶ 12–13. 
 146.  However, pirates could never be a legitimate Coast Guard because their violence is not 
sanctioned by the sovereign—in this case, Somalia. 
 147.  See Stillwell, supra note 144. 
 148.  See Guilfoyle, supra note 43, at 3–7; see also Treves, supra note 32, at 412 (“This is not use 
of force against the enemy according to the law of armed conflict, because there is no armed conflict, 
international or internal. Pirates are not at war with the states whose flotillas protect merchant vessels in 
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does not yet seem to have been framed as one encompassing the whole of 
organized pirate-fighter activity—both on shore and at sea.149  Most 
attempted applications of the threshold criteria for a NIAC have centered 
on the pirates’ actions at sea only.150  When the Tadic factors analyzed 
above are fully considered, however, the actions of organized pirate-
fighters ashore provide the most thorough and consistent support for the 
notion that a NIAC could be found in Somalia between states enforcing 
Resolution 1851 and these pirate-fighter groups.  This section addresses 
other possible objections to applying the NIAC framework to the whole of 
organized pirate activity, including the overlap with criminal law and the 
challenges U.N. member states face when making determinations about 
what law applies to their actions ashore in Somalia. 
1. Law enforcement overlap 
To be clear, I do not claim that the international law of piracy 
contained in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) does 
not apply.151  There is no reason that the international crime of piracy at sea 
could not occur in conjunction with, as well as independent of, a possible 
NIAC.  Just as those engaged in a more familiar civil war-type NIAC may 
be liable criminally for violations committed incidental to that conflict, so 
too are those parts of the pirate-fighter network that launch sea-based 
attacks.  While the attacks against merchant ships are certainly crimes of 
universal jurisdiction under international law,152 they might also be 
launched with military-style weapons using a highly organized force 
operating in networks thousands of miles from shore.  The issue of whether 
such acts are part of a much larger NIAC is a separate question from the 
issue of criminal liability for any particular act of piracy. 
2.  State practice and the challenge of recognition 
The notion that any type of armed conflict exists with pirate-fighters 
ashore is likely controversial.  The difficulty of determining whether a 
NIAC exists, especially at the lower end of the spectrum, has been 
 
the waters off the coast of Somalia . . . . Whatever opinion one holds about the applicability of the law 
of armed conflict, it is a fact that practice in the waters off Somalia seems to indicate that warships 
patrolling these waters resort to the use of weapons only in response to the use of weapons against 
them.” (emphasis added)); Sterio, supra note 70. Finally, the Lang Report, supra note 141, makes no 
mention of armed conflict. 
 149.  Guilfoyle, supra note 43, at 3–7. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  UNCLOS, supra note 15, arts. 100–105. 
 152.  See J. Ashley Roach, Countering Piracy Off Somalia: International Law and International 
Institutions, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 397, 398 (2010). 
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recognized.  In the Tablada case, the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights found that: 
[t]he most difficult problem regarding the application of Common 
Article 3 is not at the upper end of the spectrum of domestic 
violence, but rather at the lower end. The line separating an 
especially violent situation of internal disturbances from the 
“lowest” level Article 3 armed conflict may sometimes be blurred 
and, thus, not easily determined. When faced with making such a 
determination, what is required in the final analysis is a good faith 
and objective analysis of the facts in each particular case.153 
Even though the Security Council has not, as of yet, noted that this 
particular situation in Somalia rises to the level of a NIAC, a “good faith 
and objective analysis of the facts,” as the Tablada Court suggested, might 
lead some states to conclude that a NIAC exists between at least some 
organized pirate-fighters, on one side, and the Somali government 
(supported by states enforcing Resolution 1851) on the other.154  As 
tribunals have noted, the standard is difficult to apply.155  Because the 
decision of the Security Council was unclear,156 it falls to states that carry 
out the Council’s decision to undertake the analysis.157  Prospectively, 
states necessarily engage in an independent analysis of the existence of a 
NIAC—a law-triggering decision—when deciding how they might give 
effect to the Security Council’s mandate.  One could envision individual 
states giving more or less weight to the Council’s invocation of “applicable 
IHL.”158 
Presently, however, no state has publicly concluded that the situation 
has risen to a NIAC.159  As a hypothetical, suppose that organized groups 
 
 153.  Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/97, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 153 (1997) [hereinafter Tablada]. 
 154.  None of the applicable Security Council Resolutions currently recognizes a NIAC in Somalia 
involving armed pirate groups. The International Committee of the Red Cross, while recognizing the 
existence of a NIAC in Somalia between the government and the Al Shabaab militia, recognizes no 
such state of conflict vis-à-vis armed pirates.  As of this writing, no states have publicly expressed that 
IHL applies to the use of force against armed pirates, and it is unclear if EUNAVFOR made that 
affirmative conclusion prior to the May 2012 use of force. To be clear, there might be situations in 
which IHL is determined to apply without concluding that a NIAC exists.  These are explored further 
below. 
 155.  See Tablada, supra note 153, ¶ 153. 
 156.  See introduction to Section II, supra. 
 157.  This is not to suggest that any such determination would be made capriciously. Such 
conclusions are always subject to domestic and international political review, judgment, and possible 
criticism and revision. Mechanisms are in place to correct clearly erroneous conclusions, including 
review by the Security Council under Chapter VII.  See U.N. Charter, supra note 76, arts. 39–42. 
 158.  S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, ¶ 6. 
 159.  According to the author’s research as of December 31, 2013. See also supra note 154. 
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of armed pirates operated from an expansive physical headquarters on the 
coast, and employed a rigid hierarchical chain of command, including 
“Pirate Admirals” and “Flotilla Commodores” that directed the actions of 
individual ships in seeking out civilian “victim vessels” at sea.  Several 
smaller “pirate stations” dock ships and house logistics depots whose local 
commanders report directly to the high pirate headquarters. 
In this hypothetical, the headquarters formulates strategy.  Their initial 
success means that their strategy must evolve over time in response to the 
targets’ changing tactics.  Leaders at headquarters direct subordinate bases 
to launch individual attacks, but don’t micromanage details, which are left 
to individual captains and lieutenants.  Once a transiting merchant is 
located by a ship in this pirate forces network, the victim vessel would be 
subject to an attack with grenade launchers and machine gun fire. The 
specific tactics used would be modified in accordance with headquarters’ 
most recent strategic guidance.  The attack would be enough to implore the 
vessel to stop, but not to sink it or significantly damage its cargo.  Small 
boats of soldier-sailors under the command of the pirate ship’s master 
would take over the ship, commandeer it, and take all crewmembers 
hostage. 
Once taken hostage, captives would be sent back to shore via the same 
highly-developed network. At that point, other officers in the rigid 
hierarchy would kick into gear, immediately starting the negotiation 
process to demand ransom for the vessel.  Separate financiers could trade 
shares of the vessel being held, thus laying claim to future ransom payouts 
while at the same time funding more current operations. Local citizens far 
and wide know that their government’s forces are powerless to stop the 
armed pirates.  In fact, the government doesn’t even attempt to do so.  (All 
of their limited resources are engaged in fighting a separate resistance 
movement.)  Local police efforts to subdue and overtake the headquarters 
would be futile given the significant cache of military hardware that 
protects it.  By extension, the local and national authorities are powerless to 
stop the increasingly ruthless and violent attacks perpetrated by the pirates 
at sea, yet based, directed, and networked from their headquarters ashore. 
In this hypothetical, the Tadic factors—organization of the parties and 
the level of hostilities—start to approach a theoretical extreme.  It becomes 
difficult to argue that a regime of NIAC should not apply to the pirates’ 
organized and coordinated violent acts.160  As stated above, though, in 
 
 160.  The situation can even start to be seen as one of hostilities with the sovereign state, except 
that the sovereign state is powerless to initiate the use of force. In this sense, the “level of hostilities” 
prong should allow for the possibility of “latent hostilities”—situations in which the lawless group is so 
powerful and the state so relatively weak that the unlawful group should not be saved from being 
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reality it is individual states that make independent assessments of the 
existence (or lack thereof) of a NIAC based on the facts, subject to review 
and possibly clearer guidance by the Security Council.  A determination 
that there is a NIAC allows for the application of IHL, which reflects the 
reality of the required response in the above hypothetical. 
One possible conclusion states might consider is that IHL would apply 
to the use of force ashore in Somalia even if the threshold for NIAC is not 
reached.  This idea, which possibly underscored the EU’s constraints and 
targeting decisions when it used force ashore in May 2012, is explored 
further below.  But first, I look at how the substantive principles of IHL 
might be applied to the Council’s mandate for use of force against pirates. 
2. If there is a NIAC, how would IHL be applied? 
The substantive IHL applicable during NIAC is set forth in various 
sources, most specifically in AP II.161  As discussed above, AP II expands 
on Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, which bestowed certain 
minimum obligations on the parties.162  Additionally, the customary IHL 
applicable during NIAC would apply to the conduct of hostilities.163  This 
section broadly analyzes these principles specific to the application of 
force—the most relevant subset of IHL here because they are needed to 
give effect to the Council’s mandate. 
a. Destruction of pirates’ materiel 
The most fundamental customary principles of IHL—necessity, 
proportionality, and discrimination—would apply to the use of force in 
Somalia against pirates’ “boats, vessels, arms and other related 
 
considered engaged in a NIAC because of their ruthlessly violent, but possibly private ends. This would 
also approach the requirement in Tadic that an armed conflict requires “protracted armed violence 
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a state.”  
See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
 161.  See AP II, supra note 100, arts. 4–18. 
 162.  Scholars have disagreed about the applicability of AP II in situations where a foreign power 
intervenes on behalf of government forces. In the context of the situation in Mali, scholars have noted 
that, “[a] broader interpretation—one that, in the view of the present authors, better fits with the 
language employed, as well as with basic logic—is that the Protocol applies to each and every party to 
any armed conflict that meets the criteria of Article 1(1).” Rogier Bartels, The French intervention in 
Mali and Additional Protocol II, ARMED GROUPS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW BLOG (Jan. 17, 2013), 
http://armedgroups-internationallaw.org/2013/01/17/the-french-intervention-in-mali-and-additional-
protocol-ii/. 
 163.  See Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A 
Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INT’L REV. 
OF THE RED CROSS 175 (2005). 
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equipment.”164  This pirate materiel could be destroyed much as any 
military target could be designated in an armed conflict scenario, with strict 
adherence to fundamental principles of IHL. 
First, the principle of necessity would govern the selection of 
targets.165  Military necessity has historically been considered an expansive 
concept that prohibited only attacks that led to no concrete military 
advantage.166  In the case of using force on land to suppress piracy at sea, 
however, “military advantage” could be defined more narrowly to give 
precise effect to the Council’s mandate.  Anything used in the course of 
piratical attacks could be destroyed, but if a vessel, vehicle, or other piece 
of equipment is not directly enabling piracy, attacking it might be 
disallowed.  Thus, “military necessity” would be derived from the 
Council’s decision to use “all necessary measures” to suppress piracy.167 
Second, the principle of distinction requires that civilians and civilian 
objects be differentiated from lawful military targets.168  As applied here, 
states would be required to ensure that civilian residences, fishermens’ 
boats and equipment, and other objects with no direct connection to piracy 
are not targeted. 
Finally, proportionality is likely the most difficult principle to apply in 
practice.  The concrete advantage to be gained from the use of force must 
not be disproportionate to the expected civilian collateral damage.169  
Proportionality recognizes that some collateral damage is inevitable under 
the doctrine of dual effect.170  It is unclear what would constitute acceptable 
collateral damage in the piracy context.  According to one Council 
member, the possibility of collateral damage was known and therefore 
likely considered, but the Resolution passed anyway.171  The lowest 
possible thresholds would likely need to be applied so that the intent of the 
Council is met. 
 
 164.  See AP II, supra note 100, arts. 4, 13; S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, at ¶ 2. 
 165.  See, e.g., Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law—Volume I: Rules, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS 175 (2005), available at 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-international-humanitarian-law-i-icrc-eng.pdf 
(“The destruction or seizure of the property of an adversary is prohibited, unless required by imperative 
military necessity.”). 
 166.  See Michael N. Schmitt, Fault Lines in the Attack, in TESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 277, 277 (Susan Breau & Agnieszka Jachec-Neale eds., 2006). 
 167.  S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, at ¶ 6. 
 168.  See Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 165, at 25–34. 
 169.  See id. at 46. 
 170.  See DRURY, supra note 61, at 67–68. 
 171.  Press Release SC/9541, supra note 53. Dumisani Kumalo of South Africa “expressed concern 
over the provision in the resolution that allowed for States to conduct land-based operations against 
piracy, saying there was a danger that innocent Somalis could fall victim to those operations.” Id. 
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b. Possible targeting of pirate fighters 
Any determination under IHL that would support targeting suspected 
pirate-fighters themselves would be much more difficult.  By default, 
pirates are criminals and not combatants.172  Under several plausible 
circumstances, however, they could be lawfully subjected to force. 
To be subjected to targeting simply because of their status as parties to 
a NIAC, individual pirates must first be positively identified as members of 
the organized armed pirate group taking part in the conflict.173  Pirate-
fighters would constitute an “organized armed group” subject to targeting 
because of their status alone.174  Even so, there are challenges to making a 
conclusive determination about an individual’s status when they 
themselves don’t follow relevant IHL provisions regarding identifying 
themselves as parties to the conflict.175  Because of these challenges, it is 
conceivable that perhaps only very few individuals would qualify based on 
the information required for pirate fighters to be targetable simply because 
of their status. 
If not positively identified as a pirate-fighter, an individual (by default 
a protected civilian under IHL) could also take some action that causes 
them to lose their protected status, thus making them targetable.  This 
determination that the individual is directly “participating in the hostilities” 
would require a specific determination to be made prior to such targeting.  
Individuals would be targetable only “for such time as they take a direct 
part in hostilities.”176 
Both of these analyses would be difficult to execute in practice.  When 
not armed and readying for attack at sea or guarding hostages, Somali 
pirates are likely to be generally indistinguishable from fishermen, and 
might be in close proximity to other non-combatants during engagements 
that would likely take place at significant ranges.177  A rigorous 
 
 172.  See Kontorovich, supra note 11. 
 173. Id. See INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF 
NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY 4 (2006). The term “combatant” is 
unique to IAC. The term “fighter” has been used to describe individuals who engage in NIAC, but the 
term does not appear in any binding treaty. 
 174.  For a discussion of the challenges surrounding targeting individuals in NIAC, see Marco 
Sassoli & Laura Olson, The Relationship Between International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law 
Where it Matters: Admissible Killing and Internment of Fighters in Non-international Armed Conflicts, 
90 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 599, 606–07 (2008). 
 175.  AP II, supra note 100, art. 1 
 176.  AP II, supra note 100, art. 13, ¶ 3; see also Jamie A. Williamson, Challenges of Twenty-First 
Century Conflicts: A Look at Direct Participation in Hostilities, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 457, 471 
(2010). 
 177.  Proportionality concerns would also need to be addressed. 
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intelligence-based analysis and thoroughly vetted status- and conduct-
based rules of engagement (ROE) would be necessary to ensure strict 
adherence to IHL, should the NIAC framework be found to apply.  During 
a NIAC, though, such targeting would be permissible if done according to 
the principles of IHL discussed above.  Of note, the targeting of pirate-
fighters is not specifically prohibited by the text of the Resolution, and the 
“all necessary measures” language is fundamentally permissive. 
There is no evidence the Security Council even considered the 
question of specifically targeting individuals.178  The means presented here 
by which pirates could be targeted are largely jus in bello restrictions.  
There could also be a jus ad bellum restriction on targeting suspected 
Somali pirates.  That is, the pirates themselves possibly don’t fall within 
the scope of the authorization to use force under Resolution 1861.  The 
Resolution authorizes “all necessary measures . . . appropriate in 
Somalia.”179  Perhaps targeting individual pirates is not necessary to pursue 
the Council’s objectives.  Or, perhaps the Somali government would not 
consider it appropriate.  Though IHL might be found to apply to the 
conflict, these restrictions could otherwise limit the means by which the 
states aligned with the Security Council and Somalia could carry out that 
mandate for political reasons.  Under a functional approach, these limits 
would be legally unobjectionable.180 
In any case, the Security Council’s intent to use force in Somalia to 
suppress piracy might be effectively executed without targeting individual 
pirate-fighters.  A further analysis of this question is beyond the scope of 
this Article, but given the humanitarian situation in Somalia it is perhaps 
even preferable.  The restrictions discussed in this section are only those 
arising under international law.  Other concerns, including policy and 
domestic law, may cause participating states to put more robust restraints 
on the use of force in this context.  Applying IHL is possible without 
declaring pirate-fighters to be targetable per se. 
Finally, whether or not IHL applied, if an individual pirate or group of 
pirates were to launch an attack or threaten imminent attack on forces 
carrying out Resolution 1851, the use of necessary and proportional force 
 
 178.  See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9; Press Release SC/9541, supra note 53. 
 179.  S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9. 
 180.  A full examination of possible conflation issues here is beyond the scope of this analysis.  See 
generally Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus Ad Bellum and Jus 
in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 47, 102–03 (2009) (“[M]odernity has 
witnessed an erosion of the dualistic axiom. In part, this reflects the practical pressures brought to bear 
on the law of war by advances in technology, geopolitical reconfiguration following the Cold War, and 
evolution in the nature of war itself.”). 
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in self-defense would be justified.181 
B.  If the conflict falls short of a NIAC, could IHL still apply? 
A finding that a NIAC is underway between pirate-fighters and states 
enforcing Resolution 1851 might not be a necessary condition to the 
applicability of IHL.  Many commentators have recently advanced the idea 
that IHL has at least limited applicability to “gray zone” conflicts such as 
this,182 and commentators have acknowledged that there is not a full 
definition of those situations that fall within the material field of 
application of IHL.183  Additionally, there might be circumstances under 
which the conflict with organized pirate-fighters could be associated with 
the ongoing conflict between Somali government forces, Al Shabaab, and 
associated militias.184  Under these two possible scenarios, IHL might be 
applied to a situation that does not rise to the level of a discrete NIAC. 
1.  Applicability of IHL to “gray zone” conflicts 
The authorized “necessary measures”—that is, force—most recently 
taken by the EU necessarily must have been carried out according to IHL.  
While Resolution 1851 provides the jus ad bellum that justifies the use of 
force in Somalia to suppress piracy, there must also be an applicable jus in 
bello. 
“[A]pplicable IHL” was specifically cited in Resolution 1851 in the 
same sentence that ultimately authorized force.185  Commentators have 
raised the question of whether the Security Council is competent to declare 
IHL applicable to its decisions to authorize force that don’t amount to 
armed conflict.  In analyzing the Council’s authorization for force in Haiti 
in 2004, Professor Siobhán Wills raised the question: “[C]an the Security 
Council implicitly authorise use of IHL instead of [international human 
rights law] in situations where there is no armed conflict (in contradiction 
to the terms of the UN’s own Bulletin on the matter) merely by stating that 
it is ‘acting under Chapter VII’?”186 
 
 181.  U.N. Charter, supra note 76, art. 51; See also Kontorovich, supra note 11. 
 182.  See Sven Peterke, Regulating “Drugs Wars” and Other Gray Zone Conflicts: Formal and 
Functional Approaches, HUMANITARIAN ACTION IN SITUATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (HASOW), 
DISCUSSION PAPER 1, 2 (2012), available at http://hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/files/publications/ 
Svens%20Paper.pdf. 
 183.  See Vité, supra note 140, at 70. 
 184.  See GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 12, at 132. 
 185.  S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, ¶ 6. 
 186.  Siobhan Wills, The Law Applicable to Peacekeepers Deployed in Situations Where There is 
No Armed Conflict, BLOG OF THE EUR. J. OF INT’L L. (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-law-
applicable-to-peacekeepers-deployed-in-situations-where-there-is-no-armed-conflict/. 
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The issue has generated significant debate.  On one hand, the U.N. 
Security Council has “primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security” and should be competent to decide that 
customary IHL applies to the use of force it specifically authorized. 187  The 
Council’s broad authority under the U.N. Charter strongly suggests the 
power to determine the applicability of customary IHL to the uses of force 
they specifically authorized “to restore international peace and security.”188  
The U.N. Security Council is specifically competent to make “calls for the 
respect of international humanitarian law.”189 
On the other hand, some scholars have dismissed the mention of 
“applicable IHL” as merely referring to the law that would otherwise apply, 
and thus have given no practical legal effect to the Council’s calls for 
additional force on land in Somalia.190  The Security Council, however, 
chose to include a reference to IHL.  As shown in Part I, it also authorized 
force.  Thus, it is logical to apply the Security Council’s power to declare 
IHL applicable to its desired means for the purpose of reaching its desired 
end state, rather than to dismiss it as an irrelevant “savings clause.”191  A 
more persuasive interpretation might be that the “applicable IHL” is meant 
to refer to at least the general principles of customary IHL—military 
necessity, proportionality, discrimination, and humanity—without which 
the Council’s decision could not be given full effect.  Additionally, the 
nature of the force authorized suggests that if customary principles of IHL 
did not apply, then no law  (or perhaps inadequate or insufficient law) 
might be found to apply.192 
Some scholars have argued that a functional or “problem-oriented” 
approach to the application of IHL is more appropriate than a legalistic 
method of determining the existence of NIAC.193  In analogous situations, 
some states have applied customary IHL to avoid this legal void, 
sometimes in conjunction with applicable human rights law.  In the context 
of illegal narcotics, for example, “certain governments have declared 
 
 187.  U.N. Charter, art. 24, 39–42, 103; see also Christiane Bourloyannis, The Security Council of 
the United Nations and the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law, 20 DENV. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 335, 342 (1992). 
 188.  U.N. Charter, supra note 77, art. 39–42. 
 189.  See Bourloyannis, supra note 187. 
 190.  See GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 11, at 131–35; Guilfoyle, supra note 43, at 6–7 (explaining 
that the mention of applicable IHL appears to be a “savings clause included out of the abundance of 
caution.”). 
 191.  Guilfoyle, supra note 43, at 7. 
 192.  S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, at ¶ 2. 
 193.  See Peterke, supra note 182, at 16–17 (citing Daniel Thurer, INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW: THEORY, PRACTICE, CONTEXT (The Hague, Ail-Pocket 2011)). 
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organized crime groups as the most serious threats to public order and 
pursued increasingly militarized actions against them.”194  The use of para-
militarized police and armed troops in the struggle against organized crime 
groups has “raised questions about whether these situations have the 
potential to be classified as armed conflicts.”195 
The potential application of IHL to “gray zone” conflicts even outside 
of Security Council sanction seems to add further weight to the argument 
that the Council is competent to decide the applicability of IHL under 
Chapter VII.  Commentators have advocated a functional approach to 
applying IHL in gray zone conflicts.196  This approach has also been 
extended to targeting, which would allow IHL to function effectively to 
give effect to the Council’s mandate while preserving humanitarian aims.197 
2.  Association with the existing NIAC in Somalia 
Finally, there is one other entirely separate means by which armed 
pirate groups could possibly be considered to be engaged in a NIAC within 
Somalia.  Because a separate Security Council Resolution already 
recognizes a separate armed confrontation occurring within Somalia, 
association of armed pirate groups with armed insurgents could effectively 
bring these pirates within the threshold of that NIAC.198  Analysts have 
suspected localized links between various pirate factions and other Somali 
insurgent groups, including Al Shabaab.199  Scholars have advocated for 
considering pirates as terrorists, at least in certain circumstances, and have 
drawn considerable parallels between today’s terrorists and pirates.200  At 
 
 194.  Id. at 2. 
 195.  See Robert Muggah, Part 1: Rethinking the Intensity and Organization of Violence in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, REINVENTING PEACE (Feb. 16, 2012), http://sites.tufts.edu/reinventing 
peace/2012/02/16/part-i-rethinking-the-intensity-and-organization-of-violence-in-latin-america-and-the-
caribbean/. 
 196.  See Peterke, supra note 182; see also Monica Hakimi, A Functional Approach to Targeting 
and Detention, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1365, 1391–96 (2012). 
 197.  Hakimi, supra note 196. 
 198.  See S. C. Res. 1872, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1872 (May 26, 2009) (“condemn[ing] the recent 
resurgence in fighting and calls for the end of all hostilities, acts of armed confrontation and efforts to 
undermine the Transitional Federal Government . . . .”). 
 199.  See, e.g., Jonathan Saul & Camila Reed, Shabaab-Somali pirate links growing: UN 
adviser, REUTERS (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/20/ozatp-somalia-shabaab-
pirates-idAFJOE79J0G620111020; see also Richard Lough, Piracy ransom cash ends up with Somali 
militants, REUTERS (Jul. 6, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/06/somalia-piracy-idUS 
LDE7650U320110706; Khaled Wassef, Al Qaeda Urges Somalis To Attack Ships, CBS (Apr. 16, 
2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-4949488-503543.html. 
 200.  See Milena Sterio, Fighting Piracy in Somalia (and Elsewhere): Why More Is Needed, 33 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 372, 388 (2010) (“The SUA Convention . . . does solidify the link between piracy 
and terrorism, by treating piracy as a form of maritime terrorism and by equating the jurisdictional basis 
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this point, however, it does not seem that the links are robust enough to 
bring organized pirate groups within the relevant threshold.201  But it would 
be a scenario to watch closely as the circumstances may evolve. 
C.  If IHL were not applied, what law would apply? 
If IHL is ultimately found not to apply, it would present a significant 
challenge to the effective use of force ashore in Somalia under the 
provisions of Resolution 1851.  Certain parts of the Council’s mandate 
might still be carried out, but force would be limited to that allowed under 
Somali domestic law and the international human rights law obligations of 
the states giving effect to the Council’s decision.202 
The Security Council specifically noted the applicability of human 
rights law in Resolution 1851, but did not specify the scope of its 
application.  Broadly applicable international human rights norms are 
reflected in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR).203  Some international human rights instruments even 
contain a right to property, which could complicate the ability of states to 
neutralize pirates’ weapons and materiel without judicial process.204  Under 
a human rights law framework, the targeting of any pirate-fighter would 
likely be disallowed except in cases of immediate self-defense. 
A full analysis of various member states’ individual obligations under 
human rights law is beyond the scope of this Article.  The issue is 
highlighted only to note the significant challenges it presents to fully 
implementing the Council’s decision without applying IHL. Another 
significant challenge, and one that has generated great debate, is the 
“overlap problem” of competing IHL and HRL obligations.205  These 
challenges are confounded by the nature of human rights legal instruments 
themselves.  Rather than the more universal norms that characterize IHL, 
 
for the capture and prosecution of pirates with those that already exist in other antiterrorist conventions 
for the capture and prosecution of terrorists.”). 
 201.  See Singh, supra note 7. 
 202.  Somalia would be obligated to ensure that such law is consistent with international human 
rights obligations. 
 203.  ICCPR, supra note 73. 
 204.  Id. art. 9. See also European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms art. 1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the 
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions”). The European Court of Human Rights has held that the 
convention applies extraterritorially, possibly complicating many nations from participating in UN 
enforcement actions. 
 205.  See generally UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
ARMED CONFLICT, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/01, U. N. Sales No. E.11.XIV.3 (2011), available at http:// 
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HR_in_armed_conflict.pdf; see also Sassoli & Olson, supra 
note 174. 
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human rights obligations are implemented in states’ domestic law and vary 
considerably from state to state and especially by region.  This could 
potentially impact international cooperation in the fight against piracy in a 
significant way. 
Thus, applying only international human rights law to the Security 
Council’s decision in Resolution 1851 presents significant challenges to 
effectively carrying out the Council’s mandate.  These questions and 
challenges would be more satisfactorily addressed if IHL were found to 
apply to the Council’s call for the use of force to fight organized pirate-
fighters in Somalia. 
CONCLUSION 
Using targeted force on land in Somalia to cripple pirate-fighters’ 
capacity to violently attack civilian shipping and hold innocent mariners 
hostage is fully supportable under international law.  There are persuasive 
reasons that IHL should apply to the use of limited force against armed 
pirates in Somalia.  If a NIAC is determined to exist, IHL clearly applies.  
But even if there is no NIAC, the situation invokes a dynamic and evolving 
problem in the application of IHL to emerging and unique “gray zone” 
conflicts.  IHL is specifically cited by the U.N. Security Council, and is the 
lex specialis applicable to the use of force.  The level of force authorized, 
and indeed already executed, is beyond mere police action and beyond the 
applicable scope of human rights law. 
Piracy itself is an international crime.206  It is only with the talismanic 
“all necessary measures” language of Resolution 1851 that the Security 
Council authorized force under Chapter VII.207  Should such use of force 
ashore constitute sound policy, this analytical framework will hopefully be 
useful in showing how operations can be planned and conducted to satisfy 
international law.  The use of limited force ashore is intended to be 
narrowly tailored to eliminate dangerous pirates’ means of carrying out 
lethal attacks at sea and threatening mariners worldwide. 
Some scholars have argued that using force ashore to combat piracy 
would be unwise.208  This may very well be the case, and I do not attempt 
to conflate difficult questions of policy with important questions of law.  
Even if attacks at sea were not approaching their lowest level in years, 
there still may have been sound policy reasons not to use force.  Using 
 
 206.  See UNCLOS, supra note 15, art. 101, 105. 
 207.  S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, at ¶ 2. 
 208.  Lesley Anne Warner, An Appraisal of U.S. Counterpiracy Options in the Horn of Africa, 63 
NAVAL WAR COLL. REV. 61, 75 (2010). 
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force on Somali territory may have the unintended side effect of increasing 
violence against ships and current hostages.  There could also be 
unexpected collateral damage.  Another important consideration is the 
international community’s pursuit of other development goals in Somalia, 
including supporting the nascent federal government and fighting terrorist 
organizations, specifically Al Shabaab. 
While those are some of the better arguments against using force 
ashore, there are also relatively bad ones.  Several commentators have 
effectively apologized for the pirates’ actions, going so far as to credit their 
acts to “defend their coasts and support their communities.”209  The 
families of the hundreds who have been held hostage under inhumane 
conditions, or those who have been killed in piracy attacks, probably do not 
see it the same way.  If action ashore has been held in abeyance for policy 
reasons, which is likely the case, it would be much better held under the 
former set of arguments. 
It is true that piracy attacks have been receding.  But there is also 
indirect evidence that pirates and even innocent fisherman are being killed 
by overeager and untrained security guards embarked on vessels transiting 
pirate-infested waters.210  If the recent receding of maritime piracy off 
Somalia is due to private embarked security teams killing seafarers, it may 
be time to rethink any assumption that the use of targeted force ashore is 
too risky, or less humane.  Furthermore, prosecution strategies, though 
expanding, have not proven to be an effective deterrent.211 
It is time to at least acknowledge the lawfulness of decisive action—
ashore on Somali land territory with the full consent of the sovereign and 
the U.N. Security Council—to uphold the rule of law and ultimately to 
protect innocent mariners at sea.  As I have shown, a functional approach 
 
 209.  See Stillwell, supra note 144, at 136–37. 
 210.  See Bockmann & Katz, supra note 14. 
 211.  Some have maintained that changes in U.S. law are needed to more effectively fight piracy.  
See Pines, supra note 80, at 99. This may be true, but only to prosecute piracy in the courtroom. It 
remains to be seen how effective prosecuting piracy in the courtroom will prove. It is incredibly 
difficult. See, e.g., Eugene Kontorovich, A Guantanamo on the Sea: The Difficulty of Prosecuting 
Pirates and Terrorists, 98 CAL. L. REV. 243 (2010). Furthermore, there is little evidence that 
prosecuting pirates at all has served as any sort of deterrent to pirate attacks. Yvonne M. Dutton, 
Maritime Piracy and the Impunity Gap: Insufficient National Laws or A Lack of Political Will?, 86 
TUL. L. REV. 1111, 1114 (2012). Others have also suggested government security teams, which might 
be one reasonable approach. See James W. Harlow, Soldiers at Sea: The Legal and Policy Implications 
of Using Military Security Teams to Combat Piracy, 21 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 561, 565 (2012) 
(proposing the widespread deployment of military security teams). But there are thousands of ships out 
there and 2.5 million square miles of sea. That amounts to a lot of government-provided embarked 
security teams. 
 
12_OBERT_FORMAT 2 MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 6/10/2015  10:43 PM 
236 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 25:197 
that applies IHL would fully employ the legal tools available to address this 
international problem. 
 
